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Introduction 
The year 1621 marks a watershed in the history of the Banda Islands. In 
that year, the Dutch United East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-
indische Compagnie, VOC) completed its conquest of the main islands, a 
campaign in which the greater part of the population of Banda perished. 
From then on, the Dutch controlled virtually the whole of this little 
archipelago. The VOC colonized it, and from the settlers, slaves, and 
other migrants grew a wholly new society, with unique features. This 
contribution deals with the early history of this new society. 
 One would expect Banda to be a much-studied subject. As an early 
example of total colonization by a western power, it would be expected 
to provoke curiosity, the more so because the conquest and colonization 
of these islands was documented extensively, in fact, on an unprece-
dented scale. The wealth of source material enables us to reconstruct a 
story that may clarify important structural features, such as colonial 
modes of exploitation, interregional and global trade patterns, as well as 
the political, social, and cultural developments of a newly created soci-
ety. On top of this, the sources paint a vivid, sometimes dramatic, and 
realistic picture of human effort and struggle in seemingly paradisiacal 
surroundings. 
 Yet, Banda has been curiously neglected. It would not be true to say 
that the history of these islands has been completely ignored, or that it 
remains unknown to this day, but a comprehensive history based on a 
detailed analysis of the sources from a modern viewpoint has yet to be 
written. Most of the works that mention Banda deal only superficially 
with the islands, or treat them in the margin of other, broader historical 
problems. Nearly all historiography that focuses on Banda is either ob-
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solescent,1 or apologetic;2 other works are too biased,3 or too limited 
thematically4 and chronologically.5 The one work that does treat the 
whole of Bandanese history on a general level is not based on a structural 
analysis of the main sources, or at least does not mention them.6 The rest 
of what is written about Banda contains personal,7 sometimes very 
superficial,8 or propagandistic,9 views, based on traditional histori-
                                                      
1See, for instance, P. A. Tiele and J. E. Heeres, Bouwstoffen voor de ge-
schiedenis der Nederlanders in den maleisischen Archipel, 3 vols. (’s-Graven-
hage, 1886–1895); J. F. R. S. Crawford, History of the Indian Archipelago: 
Containing an account of the manners, arts, languages, religions, institutions, 
and commerce of its inhabitants, 3 vols. (Edinburg, 1820); C. J. Temminck, 
Coup d’oeul général sur les possessions Néerlandaises dans l’Inde Archi-
pélagique, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1846–1849). 
2See R. de Klerk, J. E. van Mijlendonk, W. A. Alting, Rapport over’s 
compagnies regt op de Groote Oost (Batavia, 1868); L. Kiers, Coen op Banda: 
De conqueste getoetst aan het regt van den tijd (Utrecht, 1943); C. Gerretson, 
Coens eerherstel, in De Gids 107 (1943), pp. 1–20, 55–83, 105–147. 
3See the introductory parts in J. K. J. de Jonge, De opkomst van het Neder-
landsch gezag in Oost-Indie: Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het oud-
koloniaal archief, 13 vols. (‘s-Gravenhage, 1862–1909), otherwise (like Tiele 
and Heeres, Bouwstoffen) a very useful source. 
4See, for instance, J. Mooij, Geschiedenis der protestantsche kerk in Neder-
landsch-Indië (Weltevreden, 1923); or V. I. van de Wall, De Nederlandsche 
oudheden in de Molukken (’s-Gravenhage, 1928). 
5See the excellent articles of N. P. van den Berg, “Vijf jaren op Banda, 
1633–1638,” Tijdschrift voor de Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (TBG) 
18 (1872): 332–366; and V. I. van de Wall, “Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der 
perkeniers 1621–1671,” TBG 74 (1934). 
6W. A. Hanna, Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and its aftermath in the 
Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia, 1978). 
7See P. C. van der Wolk, “Tropen-romantiek: Geschiedenis van onze noot-
muskaat-cultuur (uit de geschiedenis der Oost-Indische Compagnie op de 
Banda-eilanden),” Cultura 32 (1920): 100–113, 157–168, 190–201, 259–269, 
307–314, 344–354, 376–385, and 33 (1921): 60–85; or H. Breitenstein, “Twee 
jaar op Banda,” in De aarde en haar volken (n.p., 1916), pp. 73–86. 
8See, for instance, A. S. Bickmore, “A description of the Banda Islands,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 12 (1868): 324–334; J. Finn, 
“Beschrijving van de Bandasche eilanden, en de gesteldheid van derzelver 
bewoners,” Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië 3 (1840): 385–396; or H. O. 
van der Linden, Banda en zijne bewoners (Dordrecht, 1873). 
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ographical opinions,10 or on Bandanese folklore.11 Such works also 
regularly appear in the form of—admittedly—quite readable and infor-
mative travel stories,12 which however are not very penetrating when it 
comes to historical explanation. 
 All this criticism certainly does not aim to depreciate the existing 
literature, but simply to point out its limitations, and the resulting diffi-
culties for a more complete historical reconstruction from a modern—
postcolonial, or at least less biased—perspective. For a fresh attempt at 
historical explanation we must first return to the sources. 
 In my Ph.D. thesis13 I certainly do not intend to write a general his-
tory of Banda through the centuries. I merely propose to contribute to 
that effort, hopefully in a fundamental way. The thesis covers a vital pe-
riod of Bandanese history. It will be written on the basis of extensive 
research of all available archival sources in the Algemeen Rijksarchief 
(General State Archives) in The Hague, Netherlands, as well as relevant 
documents elsewhere that complement or correct this information. To 
keep the project feasible in the face of such a wealth of material, I have 
                                                                                                                        
9Since the end of the 19th century, a whole range of often personally in-
volved authors have published pleas for investment in, and development of the 
then waning Banda Islands. See, for instance, P. C. Lans, Rozengain, een der 
eilanden van de Bandagroep, een goudmijn in de toekomst: Plan tot ontginning 
en ontwikkeling van dat eiland (Rotterdam, 1872); O. Kamerlingh Onnes, Banda 
nutmeg and mace: Being an account of their history, cultivation, trade and use 
(Amsterdam, 1900); P. C. van der Wolk, Een eereschuld jegens Banda, De 
Indische Gids 43 (1921): 718–725. 
10Usually based on the not always reliable F. Valentijn, Oud- en nieuw Oost-
Indien, 8 vols. (Dordrecht, 1724–1726). 
11See anon., “Prinses Adeka: Een Bandanesche legende,” Eigen haard: Ge-
illustreerd volkstijdschrift 44 (1918): 560–562. 
12See, for instance, Q. M. R. VerHuell, Herinneringen van eene reis naar de 
Oost-Indien, 2 vols. (Haarlem, 1835–1836); J. Olivier Jz., Reizen in den 
Molukschen Archipel, naar Makassar, ..., in het gevolg van den gouverneur-
generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië, in 1824 gedaan ..., 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 
1834–1837); H. W. Ponder, In Javanese waters: Some sidelights on a few of the 
countless, lovely, little known islands scattered over the Banda Sea and some 
glimpses of their strange and stormy history (London, 1944); J. E. Elmberg, 
Islands of tomorrow (London, 1956). 
13To be published in 1996, under the title Pioneers and Perkeniers. The 
population and exploitation of the Banda Islands, ca. 1620–1670. 
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confined my research to some five decades following 1620. This covers 
the formative period just after the conquest, as well as the next two or 
three generations of settlers, during which production grew to surpass the 
pre-1621 level, and a new society materialized. 
 In this article, I will first go into the events preceding the conquest of 
1621 to put the new Banda in historical perspective. Then I will roughly 
sketch the fundamentals of the new society after the conquest, based on 
both the existing literature and on some of the results of my own archival 
research. In doing so I will also try to shed some light on my as-
sumptions and explain my intentions in writing a history of Banda during 
this period, as well as the way in which I intend to achieve this. Finally, I 
will try to look at this case from a wider angle, by comparing it with a 
preliminary theoretical model of—in my view—striking similarity. This 
will put Banda in an entirely different light. 
Dutch conquest 
In 1599 the Dutch first reached the ten small islands of Banda,14 at that 
time the sole source of nutmeg and mace.15 They were received cordially 
by the Bandanese, who were trying to get rid of the Portuguese. Since the 
arrival of Antonio d’Abréu in 1511, the Bandanese had cautiously but 
stubbornly resisted Portuguese initiatives to gain a foothold on the 
islands and spread the Catholic faith.16 Now they had finally found 
powerful allies, who were all too willing to help them. The VOC did 
indeed chase out the Portuguese, but when they also built a fort and a 
trading post on Neira the Bandanese soon found out that now they were 
                                                      
14For the sake of clarity I will use the names mentioned in the Dutch sources 
(with the present names added in parentheses): Neira (Naira), Lonthoir (Lontar 
or Bandar Besar), Goenoeng Api (Gunung Api), Rosengain (Pulau Hatta), Ay 
(Ai), Roen (Run), Vrouweneiland or Kraka (Pulau Karaka), Kapal (Manukang), 
Pisang (Pulau Syahrir), and Neilaka (Naialaka). The more distant uninhabited 
Swangi (Suwangi) is not always reckoned to be part of the Banda Islands. 
15An extensive, informative account of Dutch presence and activities until 
1621 is J. A. van der Chijs, De vestiging van het Nederlandsch gezag over de 
Banda-eilanden (1599–1621) (Batavia, 1886). The following narrative leading 
up to the conquest is mainly based on this work. 
16An excellent account of Portuguese activities in the islands is J. Villiers, 
“Trade and society in the Banda Islands in the sixteenth century,” Modern Asian 
Studies 15 (1981): 723–750. 
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worse off with the Dutch than with their former adversaries. The Dutch 
had specific ideas about the trade in nutmeg and mace, and they pos-
sessed the military power to impose their demands. They wanted the 
Bandanese to commit themselves to trade the spices exclusively with 
them. This monopoly was to be effectuated by contracts between the 
VOC and the Bandanese authorities. Whether the orangkaya did not un-
derstand these Western-style documents, or remained uncommitted to 
them because they had been forced to sign away their economic freedom 
under threat of the awesome maritime and military presence of the 
Dutch, the fact remains that the contracts were breached as soon as the 
ink was dry. Being dependent on overseas trade for the purchase of food 
and other vital commodities, the Bandanese continued to barter their 
nutmeg and mace with other nations, just as they had always done. They 
thereby earned themselves a reputation as unreliable “allies” in the eyes 
of the indignant Dutch. 
 Several attempts to settle the matter only resulted in disturbed rela-
tions with the indigenous population, culminating in an attack on a dip-
lomatic delegation in 1609. Forty-six Dutch, including the leading officer 
Pieter Verhoeven and his staff, were massacred. Growing English 
competition for the Bandanese spice monopoly meanwhile tilted the bal-
ance even more strongly in favor of military options. By 1614, the Com-
pany’s directors in the Netherlands, Heeren XVII, were willing to realize 
the long contemplated conquest of the islands, even if that meant de-
stroying the people and suffering great financial outlay. Violence toward 
the Bandanese, which had until then merely taken the form of relatively 
small-scale punitive expeditions (as in 1610 when the Dutch had vainly 
attacked Ay), now came to be used as a strategy. In 1615 the Dutch for 
the first time tried to conquer Ay, but they were repulsed just as they had 
been before. However, strong suspicion of English meddling in “their” 
affairs, and regional competition from Makassarese and Javanese traders 
convinced the Dutch to persevere. So, in the following year, 240 Dutch 
and 23 Japanese invaded and conquered Ay, despite fierce resistance. 
Many defenders were killed and another 400 (many women and children 
among them) drowned while trying to flee to the nearby island of Run. 
 The fall of Ay did not fail to make a strong impression on the Lon-
thoirese. Despite this, they soon resumed trading with their former part-
ners, including the English who had nestled in Run and on Nailaka, a 
tiny, clifflike, easily defended stronghold to the north of that island. The 
{ PAGE } CAKALELE, VOL. 5 
contract policy of the Dutch thus never had the desired effect. For this 
reason, Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen decided to settle the 
matter once and for all. At the end of 1620, shortly after the consolida-
tion of the Dutch in Jacatra, which safeguarded their food supplies, he 
led an expeditionary force of 19 VOC ships manned by 1,655 European 
and 286 Asian troops. In Banda a local contingent of troops and 36 in-
digenous vessels were added to this formidable force. 
 What followed in the next few weeks is certainly one of the blackest 
pages in the history of Dutch overseas expansion. In a ruthless and 
bloody campaign Coen and his commanders tried to bring the main is-
land of Lonthoir under Dutch occupation. After initial swift success by 
the Dutch, the orangkaya turned to Coen to try to bargain for a new 
contract that would have given in completely to Dutch demands. Instead, 
the main leaders were captured and tried, and 48 of them were beheaded 
by the able Japanese executioners who had joined the Dutch as merce-
naries. The families of the orangkaya (some 789 old men, women and 
children) were shipped off to Batavia; some of them were put to work as 
slaves and ended up as far away as Ceylon (present Sri Lanka). On see-
ing the destruction that the Dutch caused to the coastal villages, and the 
impossibility of coming to terms with them, the Lonthoirese who had 
survived the invasion fled into the mountains. Over the following months 
their strongholds were besieged by the Dutch, who had great trouble 
conquering them. In the end, large groups of despairing men, women, 
and children jumped to their death off the cliffs near Selamma or chose 
to starve, rather than surrender. Only a few managed to build boats and 
escape by night to the Kai Islands, Seramlaut, Kisar, and other small 
islands of the Goram Islands. The small, terrified population of the outer 
island Rosingain was deported to the main islands and subsequently 
spread over the nutmeg plantations as forced laborers. After the 
conquest, only about 1000 of the estimated 15,000 inhabitants of the 
Banda Islands remained, among them a few hundred unaffected on Run. 
Solely because of the English presence, this island was not involved in 
the fighting. Lacking effective protection, however, the inhabitants were 
forced by Coen to enter into new contractual obligations. 
 After this, VOC authority over the Banda Islands was virtually com-
plete. Intermittent English presence on Nailaka and claims to Run did not 
seriously bother the Dutch, even though they did evacuate the island for 
security reasons and extirpated all the nutmeg trees. Subsequently the 
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island was left to grow wild, and cattle were allowed to roam free to 
provide food for the other islands. In 1638, the English were denied 
access to Run because the Dutch feared that they would use it as a base 
to smuggle nutmeg from Banda to Makassar, then a free haven of trade 
opposition to the Dutch in Indonesian waters. To prevent this, VOC of-
ficials visited Run annually thereafter. English exploitation subsequently 
remained a dead letter. The matter was not settled until the 1667 Peace of 
Breda, when the English finally gave up their claims, and the Dutch 
formally gained complete possession of the Banda Islands.17 
 All this serves to prove the determination with which the Dutch exe-
cuted their monopolist strategy. However, they confronted huge prob-
lems when they took possession of the islands in 1621. The whole of 
Bandanese society was destroyed. The islands were almost devoid of 
inhabitants, and the people of Rosingain—and later Run as well—were 
rooted from their villages and spread over Neira, Lonthoir, and Ay. The 
stubborn resistance on Lonthoir posed an extra problem that lasted for 
months after the conquest. Prior to effective occupation, some 2,000 de-
fenders18 had to be driven from the mountains, for they threatened the 
exploitation of economic resources. With the exception of Ay, economic 
activities in most islands had come to an almost complete standstill by 
then. In such a state, the islands could only generate costs, without any 
benefits, for the Company. To reap any fruit from its military success, 
the VOC would have to harness all its organizational skills and resume 
production of the highly profitable nutmeg and mace as soon as possible. 
To this end, Governor-General Coen left his commander Martinus Sonck 
with specific instructions. 
                                                      
17At that time, the Dutch considered it a good bargain to gain possession 
over Run as well as part of the Guyana Coast, nowadays called Surinam, while 
in return they handed over their North American settlement called Nieuw 
Amsterdam to the English, who subsequently baptized it New York. 
18Among them 600 men; estimate by Coen in his letter to Heeren XVII, 6 
May 1621. See, for this and other letters of Coen mentioned, H. T. Colenbrander 
and W. Ph. Coolhaas, eds., Jan Pieterszoon Coen: Bescheiden omtrent zijn ver-
blijf in Indië, 7 vols. (’s-Gravenhage, 1919–1943), notably vol. 1 (containing 
letters from Coen to his superiors), in this case p. 631. 
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 Coen had never made it a secret that he intended to plant colonies of 
Dutch and other Europeans in Asia.19 They would provide the VOC with 
basic needs, as well as maintain an inter-Asian trade network—though 
not in the Company’s monopoly goods, of course—that would provide a 
foundation for Company operations. In Coen’s view, permanent settlers 
would greatly reduce the Company’s payroll and increase the revenues 
from tolls and taxes. Business in Asia was thus expected to be self-sup-
porting, leaving the profits of the spice trade entirely to the motherland. 
In this manner, the expensive and risky transfer of minted money to Asia 
could be reduced to a necessary minimum as well. Another advantage of 
permanent settlement was that in times of war the colonists could quickly 
be mobilized to defend the Company, on whose well-being they 
singularly depended.20 In Coen’s view, a policy of permanent settlement 
would be the cheapest, safest, and most stable way to do business in 
Asia. Banda provided a chance to carry out this plan. 
 The VOC formed the outward “shell” of the colony’s life. It took care 
of maritime and military protection (ships and forts) and infrastructure 
(transport, buildings, water basins and wells, and facilities for home 
industries). It also imported the basic requirements necessary to run the 
new settlement, for—apart from some fruits, vegetables, and livestock—
Banda lacked nearly everything to support a community. The VOC 
committed itself to supply slaves, and to keep a stock of rice sufficient 
for about one year, selling this at fixed prices to the settlers.21 
                                                      
19His ideas can be traced back to suggestions made by earlier influential 
VOC officials such as Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge in 1608, Pieter Both and 
Jacques l’Hermite de Jonge in 1612. On Coen’s ideas, see for instance his letter 
to Heeren XVII, 10 November 1614 (Colenbrander and Coolhaas, Jan Pieters-
zoon Coen, vol. 1, pp. 52–92, esp. 56–57, 88–89). Years later, his opinions about 
the best way to control Asian trade had not yet changed significantly. See his 
Advijs aen den gouverneur generael Pieter de Carpentier (a “memorandum of 
transfer” upon his return to the Republic, 31 January 1623) and his Vertoogh van 
de staet der Vereenichde Nederlanden in de quartieren van Oost-Indien, 20 June 
1623, both published in Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te 
Utrecht (KHG) 9 (1853): 67–95 and 95–129, esp. 118–119). 
20For that matter, all Europeans, whether or not they were Dutch had to 
pledge allegiance to the United Provinces. (Many were fortune-seekers from all 
over the continent.) 
21Slaves (aged between 15 and 30 years), usually recorded as movables, not 
as inhabitants, were sold at 40 rials. Rice cost 40 rials per last. (A reaal or reaal 
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 In a manner similar to the partition of Ay after 1616, the arable land 
was divided into lots, called perken,22 and handed out to European im-
migrants, henceforth called perkeniers. Actually this was done on a ten-
ancy basis, although colonists who received a perk soon looked upon 
themselves as private owners.23 Along with the higher ranks of VOC 
officials, they considered themselves the upper crust of the new society. 
The initial division of the total area was only completed in 1628, al-
though this did not mean that everything was settled and unchanged from 
then on. In the subsequent years, perken were quite often enlarged 
through the acquisition of part or all of neighboring plots, or diminished 
when the perken of deceased planters were divided among sons or debt-
ors. It is thus very hard to give a quick survey of how many perken there 
were at this stage, or who the proprietors were. 
Scope of inquiry 
At this point, I would like to interrupt the brief description of the new 
society, to say a little more about the assumptions and procedures of my 
research. Studying a past society, I think it is impossible to separate the 
different fields of human activity without endangering the total view, or 
at least reducing its validity. Fortunately, Banda is a tiny geographical 
region, with a population of only about 4,000 in the mid 1620s, and the 
sources are not so abundant that I have to limit myself chronologically in 
a way that would detract from the project as a whole. These geographic 
and demographic limitations enable me to study the political, economic, 
social, and religious activities of the Bandanese population during a pe-
riod of some fifty years, keeping an eye open for demographic, cultural, 
and psychological developments or incidents as well. Information on any 
field of human activity will contribute to the reconstruction of the story 
                                                                                                                        
van achten, roughly equivalent to a rijksdaalder or 2? guilders, was at that time 
valued at 55 stuivers. A last weighed about 3,000 Hollandsche ponden [Dutch 
pounds], a little less than 1,500 kilograms). 
22Literally “parks,” meaning orchards. 
23There are no contracts or title deeds left, nor even references to any, so it 
has to be assumed that these were never drawn up. The fact that the alienation of 
a perk was to be registered and taxed at a quarter of the selling price, indicates 
that the Company kept regarding the perkeniers as tenants, instead of legal 
proprietors. 
{ PAGE } CAKALELE, VOL. 5 
of this colonial society. This wide range of interest is exemplified by 
some of the questions that I have formulated: 
 • What was the policy of the VOC towards Banda? Was it restrictive, 
stimulating, tolerant, indifferent? 
 • How did the partition of perken and subsequent tenure take place? 
When did the perkeniers begin to look upon their lot as private property? 
 • Who were the perkeniers? What was their country of origin, their 
background? Where did they settle? Did they bring their wives and 
families, or did they start a family in Asia, with Asian wives or concu-
bines? 
 • What was the role of the slaves? How many were there, where did 
they come from, how were they treated? Did creolization, marooning, or 
manumission occur? 
 • What was the position of other inhabitants, for instance, the Euro-
pean or Asian free-traders? 
 • What was the extent of the economic activities? What was the pro-
duction, the proceeds, the quality of spices? 
 • What form did the local economic structure take? How was eco-
nomic ownership divided? Was there any stratification based on wealth, 
other than the division between European planters and Asian slaves? 
 • What sorts of lives did the new Bandanese live? What were their 
religions, (sub)cultural activities, and occupations? To what degree was 
all this determined by the structure of the economic activities? 
 • Did this settlement really develop toward a society in any way 
comparable to any other in the VOC’s chartered area? 
 These are all questions that can be answered, at least partially, by 
systematically screening the sources, paying special attention to material 
not yet—or only crudely—analyzed. This includes statistical data on 
demographic aspects of the colony, as well as production and transpor-
tation figures that might indicate how much nutmeg and mace left the 
islands, and how much actually arrived in Batavia. Coupled with the fig-
ures for the quantities aboard the fleets bound for home, this would indi-
cate what the volume of production was, and the effect it might have had 
on inter-Asian trade, whether legal or illegal. 
 There is indeed a lot of source material on the Dutch activities in 
Banda. The presence of the VOC during the 17th and 18th century gen-
erated a steady, ever-increasing flow of letters, reports, and other docu-
ments sent either to Batavia or to the directors in the Netherlands. Scru-
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tiny of such documents offers the possibility of finding answers to 
questions that have not yet been posed. But they cannot tell us the whole 
story, unfortunately. They push us in the direction of a Europeanized, or 
at least Company-centered, story of the kind we have so often seen in the 
past. That would not do justice to the other inhabitants of Banda, nor 
would it meet my goal of describing Bandanese society as a whole, in-
stead of only the best-documented part of it. I hope to be able to offer 
insights into the lives of the colonists and the other inhabitants of the 
new Banda as well, including the slaves and freeholders. Of these last 
categories we know barely anything. It should at least be possible to 
document the quantitative aspects of this part of the population, even if it 
remains difficult to develop a sufficiently clear view of their actual lives 
and occupations. 
 For this, it is necessary to consult sources other than the VOC’s. Un-
fortunately, there are not many left. Only a few officials, for different 
reasons, kept personal diaries or took notes.24 Many private records and 
documents of this kind are missing. The perkeniers themselves certainly 
were not very literate; that much is clear about their cultural background. 
Thus, the careful, imaginative scrutiny of Company sources for circum-
stantial evidence is all that is left when scarce private documents or other 
letters and reports fail to provide a clear picture. It remains to be seen 
whether this will prove a flaw in the project. 
Life in the new Banda 
How then did Company officials, perkeniers, slaves and other inhabitants 
create a new Banda after 1621? Although at least on Lonthoir most 
villages and buildings had been destroyed, the greater part of the nutmeg 
trees were undamaged. Even so, it took some time to clear the grounds of 
debris and to weed the severely neglected orchards in order to allow 
proper harvesting. But due to a continuous cycle of three harvests per 
year, production could basically be resumed as soon as the required 
workforce had been brought in.25 In this effort, the remaining members 
                                                      
24See notably the Gijsels Collection in the Baadische Landesbibliothek in 
Karlsruhe, Germany (also on film in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague), 
as well as the personal diary of Rev. Wouter Melchiorsz. Vitriarius in the 
Gemeente Archief in Amsterdam. 
25Even so, it took years before the Dutch found out about the best way to 
grow, harvest, and pack the spices. Most of their horticultural and agricultural 
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of the indigenous population were used,26 although the Company pre-
ferred to deport them and replace them with slaves of overseas origin, 
since the Bandanese were regarded as untrustworthy and generally reluc-
tant to contribute to production. Besides, there were not enough Ban-
danese left. So the Company brought in shiploads of slaves, who were 
usually acquired from regional slave markets on the coasts where the 
VOC traded, if they were not prisoners. On Ay there was a substantial 
group from Siauw, taken there after 1616. After the final subjugation of 
Banda in 1621, slaves were imported from Gujerat, Malabar, Coroman-
del, the Malay peninsula, Java, Borneo, coastal China, Bouton, several 
parts of Maluku, Kai, and Aru. Spanish, Javanese, and Makassarese 
prisoners were added. During the first decades the Company had to en-
sure a continuous stream of slaves because many of them died—due to 
poor treatment, harsh conditions, illness (especially beriberi), and sheer 
misery—or tried to flee overseas. During these formative years there was 
hardly any creolization, but later the population appears to have 
stabilized, since the import of slaves on a grand scale (hundreds at a 
time) diminished. 
 The perkeniers were entitled to a specified number of slaves,27 nec-
essary to work the land, maintain the trees, weed, and to harvest and 
process the nutmeg and mace. Of course, these forced laborers had to be 
fed, clothed, housed, and controlled in their daily work as well as for 
security reasons. All this was the task of the perkeniers, who received 
full material and military support and protection from the Company of-
ficials and soldiers stationed in the forts and strongholds. But neither 
these soldiers nor their civilian masters could prevent the escape of 
slaves from the islands, especially during the first years. Although the 
                                                                                                                        
knowledge appears to have come from the former owners and workers of the 
land, the enslaved Bandanese. 
26Some of the women and children who had been transported to Batavia 
were returned to Banda as well, to work as slaves in their own country. This was 
done because they were judged to be a security risk to the Batavia population, as 
they were all living together in a designated quarter of the new city. 
27Actually the size of a perk was expressed in zielen (souls), that is to say, 
the number of laborers necessary to work the area. This could differ sub-
stantially according to differences in terrain. For instance, Ay is very flat and 
easily manageable, while a great part of Lonthoir is quite mountainous and 
difficult to tend. 
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escapees usually stole away in small groups, the frequency of escapes 
became a steady trickle that greatly worried the planters and Company 
officers. Escapes combined with sickness, death, and the general nega-
tive attitude of the slaves caused labor shortages that endangered the 
harvesting and processing. Even more disturbing was the fact that the 
enslaved Bandanese, especially those deported from Run, usually es-
caped with the help of their compatriots who had previously fled to 
Seram and neighboring islands, and had settled there after 1621. During 
moonlit nights these maroons came in with kora-kora to the outer coasts 
of Lonthoir or to Rosingain, sometimes even into the passages between 
Neira and Lonthoir, and as far as Run. When caught, they were away 
before the Dutch could get them, swiftly making for their hideouts in 
their small craft. This even forced the Dutch to acquire and man orembai 
and kora-kora in order to patrol the seas around Banda at night, occupy-
ing a home guard of colonists, supplemented with whatever soldiers and 
sailors the garrisons could spare. Also, extra fortified strongholds had to 
be built on the outer coasts of Lonthoir, controlling comparatively de-
serted bays or anchoring places such as Wayer and Denner, to prevent 
these Bandanese maroons from landing. Not only did the returning Ban-
danese assist their compatriots, they also abducted other (unwilling) 
slaves, stole cattle, and even attacked the European population. In short, 
during these first years they posed a serious threat to the new society on 
Banda.28 
 The perkeniers committed to sell the entire harvest of nutmeg and 
mace to the Company, again at fixed prices.29 This money enabled them 
to buy the products available in the Company’s stores, as well as slaves. 
It is not exactly clear what European commodities were actually im-
ported, but it seems mainly to have been limited to the bare necessities of 
life, such as food, clothes (including such out-of-place garments as 
gabardine stockings and black felt hats), tools (for craftsmen as well as 
for private use), paper and pencils, weapons, building materials (bricks, 
lead, timber), stores of anything from lamp oil to medicines, not forget-
ting many barrels of beer, wine, and arak. But less basic utensils, such as 
                                                      
28In the sources, a real fear of invasion by these Bandanese, with local, 
Makasarese or even Spanish or Portuguese support, is repeatedly expressed. 
29For the period I am concerned with, the VOC obliged itself to pay one rial 
per cati banda nuts, and ten per cati banda mace (one cati banda weighed 5? 
Hollandsche ponden, about 2? kilograms). 
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books (for church and school use), pewter, or porcelain crockery (for the 
table of the governor) were also brought in from Batavia. The prime 
trading article imported to deal with other peoples in the region was 
cloth. 
 But what Banda basically needed was food. Apart from the rice ac-
quired via the Company (which was mostly of Javanese, sometimes 
Siamese or Japanese, origin), the inhabitants tried to obtain other types of 
food, mainly sago, but also smaller quantities of salt, coconuts, peas, and 
kacang hijau. They also tried to acquire Asian commodities to barter 
with, such as coarse cloth, gongs, or weapons. For this they would turn to 
the free traders who called at Banda, either Dutch or Asian. The first 
were for the greater part former Company personnel whose contract had 
expired, fortune-seekers who had decided to stay in Asia and make a 
living through interisland trade. Some of them, known as vrijburgers 
(free burgers), had their base in the roadstead of Neira. They traded in 
anything profitable outside the Company’s monopoly (and probably 
within it, as well), but mostly foodstuffs. There might also have been 
Asian free-traders who had established themselves in Banda (we know 
there were quite a few before 1621), but the sources for the first years 
make no mention of them. The Asian traders who called at Banda were 
(eastern) Javanese as well as some Makassarese, but mostly sailors from 
Kai and Aru; somewhat later, Seramese traders also appeared in Banda. 
They exemplify the continuation—on a smaller scale, and of different 
content, for spices were no longer marketable—of the traditional, varied 
trade flow to and from Banda, for centuries a center of interregional im-
portance before this economy was disrupted by the conquest of 1621. 
Insofar as Asian traders had a passport, or permission from the VOC, 
they as well, like the European free traders, were allowed to trade any-
thing except goods under VOC monopoly. Apart from the foodstuffs 
mentioned, this consisted of home products like tortoise shell, bird of 
paradise feathers, or sandalwood, but also the much appreciated prefab-
ricated orembai and kora-kora from Kai. These products were generally 
bartered for a variety of cloth, imported by the Company mainly from the 
Coromandel coast. A toll had to be paid to the Company over the value 
of traded goods. 
 The Company also levied a tax of ten percent on home-made arak. 
The perkeniers preferred arak distilled from rice, but when this was 
prohibited because excessive amounts of dear Javanese rice were used 
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for that purpose, they turned to tuak. Mace and nutmeg itself were taxed 
as well, to the same level. The Company farmed out fishing rights, fruit 
production, and the right to distill arak. Enterprising settlers could thus 
try to earn some additional money by selling the yield of these rights to 
their fellow inhabitants. But to the Company, this did not mean a sub-
stantial income, because especially during these first years, the tax-
farmers could not pay their dues, as there existed severe shortages of 
minted money, and a great many indebted settlers. 
 Matters of administration were entirely dealt with by the Company’s 
officials based on the islands, as a rule living in, or close to the forts or 
strongholds. The centers of Company administration were based in Fort 
Nassau on Neira, and Fort Revenge on Ay. Jurisdiction, and the imple-
mentation of the judicial system—analogous to the laws and jurispru-
dence customary in the Dutch Republic—initially belonged exclusively 
to the VOC as well, but soon afterwards a court of law (raad van justi-
tie), made up of Company as well as civilian members, was installed 
both in Neira and Ay. Even so, in case of corporal or capital punishment, 
execution of the sentence required confirmation of the governor and his 
council, and as before, major offenses continued to be treated by this 
body. 
 There was one other factor that played a significant role in the new 
society: the church. The official religion of the VOC was the Dutch ver-
sion of Calvinism, and hence the Dutch Reformed Church was the sole 
denomination tolerated in Banda (for Europeans). Catholicism, intro-
duced during the sixteenth century by Portuguese Jesuits, was forbidden 
and stamped out. The slaves could retain their Islamic or animistic belief 
but had to be converted to Protestantism if possible. Female slaves 
adopted as a wife by colonists had to be baptized first. Any convert had 
to prove his or her (limited) knowledge of the principles of the Christian 
faith and be able to at least phonetically recite the Our Father and some 
prayers or psalms, and answer correctly when questioned on the Cate-
chism. Even as the Christian standards of such converts (as well as that 
of the Europeans, for that matter) were often mocked, and the Church 
council complained about the unruly and ignorant flock, the church and 
its servants (ministers, schoolteachers, and visitors or the sick) still man-
aged to influence and control the spiritual life of the inhabitants, as well 
as the implementation of formalized education and the greater part of 
health care (for what it was worth) and welfare. These men represented 
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an authority other than the Company’s. Depending on their own moral 
quality, they had some influence over the population of the islands, in 
fact quite substantial compared to the real administrative powers and the 
means the church possessed. For these means were few: the Company, 
though it had by its charter committed itself to the upholding and spread 
of the true Christian faith, did this in a way that can at many times only 
be described as minimalist. Contrary to what was customary in the Re-
public, and much to the indignation of the clergy, the Company also de-
manded a seat in the Church councils, in order to have full inside infor-
mation on what was decided, and under which considerations. Apart 
from this cooperative, but rather authoritarian and stingy Company atti-
tude, the church and its officials, like everyone else in Banda, remained 
totally dependent on the Company for their own maintenance, as well as 
for books, paper, pencils, transportation and anything else needed for the 
fulfillment of their tasks. Nevertheless, churches and schools existed in 
Neira, Ay and Fort Hollandia on Lonthoir (and later in other settlements, 
too). The two, sometimes three reverends toured the islands in order to 
uphold the moral quality of the inhabitants, by organizing services and 
Bible readings; caretakers of the sick watched over the spiritual health of 
the population. There is no doubt that the church in this way formed an 
important means of social cohesion (although admittedly the Christian 
layer of this society remained rather thin), accomplished in spite of a 
critical Company attitude and quite moderate means. 
 
This sketch of the new society is sufficient to emphasize the almost total 
dependency of the colonists on the VOC. There was not a single aspect 
of life in Banda that was not—actively or passively—controlled by the 
Company, from the fundamental conditions of life in Banda down to the 
more common, or less urgent requirements. Even structural aspects such 
as social stratification, or the character of economic exploitation were a 
priori, or in the end determined by Company influence, consciously. 
Nothing in Banda during this period can be seen outside this framework 
of VOC dominance, not even activities that for the greater part took 
place outside its perception, such as interregional trade by indigenous 
peddlers. Yet, as I will try to show, in Banda there developed a society 
which had specific characteristics of its own, peculiar and even unique 
when compared to other contemporary cases of colonial exploitation. 
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 For a start, the case of Banda greatly differs from the usual mode of 
colonial dominance the Company exercised in Maluku or elsewhere in 
Asia. When we take a broad look at Dutch expansion in Asia during the 
early 17th century, we can see that, as a rule, the VOC worked its way 
into a market by opening a trading post or factory on the coast and doing 
business with local traders or governmental officials. They submitted 
themselves at least nominally to the authority of the ruler in situ, stuck to 
local rules and taxation, and agreed to do business on an equal footing. 
Thus they presented themselves primarily as traders or merchants, not as 
colonizers or rulers. And in effect, it seems that the VOC superiors were 
at that stage not so much interested in territorial power per se, but 
basically in making money by albeit warlike and aggressive trade. 
Anything that unbalanced the profits, such as the great cost of conquest, 
occupation, and administration, had in principle to be avoided. 
 But when, for whatever reason, this policy was judged to fall short of 
the desired objective, they did not hesitate to use their very powerful 
means to set the situation to their liking. This usually meant the effective 
removal of the local superiors, by coercion or by sheer force, after which 
the VOC officials took over the leading administrative positions. The 
merchant thus became governor, taking into possession a territorial unity, 
and ruling an indigenous society with traditions and laws of its own. 
 On Banda, neither the first nor the second pattern was followed, as we 
have seen above. By sheer violence, the population, and consequently 
societal and economic structures, were (almost) totally destroyed, leaving 
a near-empty land to be recreated from literally the bottom up. This is a 
feature that makes Banda a case that can hardly be compared with others, 
at least not with somewhat more familiar examples like Amboyna, the 
north coast of Java, or the settlements in India and Ceylon. 
 For reason of its economic value, for the sheer profitability of nutmeg 
and mace, Banda was conquered and transformed into a new society. In a 
deliberate manner the VOC created an agricultural production colony, 
using an exploitational system that was uncommon to the experience of 
VOC officials, and unheard of in Asia. As such, Banda was different 
from any other settlement founded within the boundaries of the chartered 
area of the VOC at any stage between 1602 when the Company was 
founded, and 1795 when it collapsed under its own weight. Even 
Batavia, designed to be a rendezvous and a governmental center, was not 
meant to be a production settlement, certainly not for agricultural 
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production. And in fact it never became one, at least not beyond the point 
of self-sufficiency.30 Another seemingly comparable settlement, Cape of 
Good Hope, was originally meant as a fruit and vegetable garden for the 
VOC ships that touched at this southernmost point of Africa, before they 
started their way on the long and risky stretch to the passage between 
Sumatra and Java, where there was no possibility to take in provisions 
until the ships reached Batavia. Thus the Cape’s agricultural production 
was instrumental to the VOC infrastructure, important enough from a 
strategic viewpoint, but never an economic target in itself, as an area that 
yielded substantial profits as a result of export production. 
 This makes Banda an atypical case of VOC colonialism, a unique 
example of European expansion in Indonesia, or even Asia, during the 
Early Modern period. In itself this is sufficiently interesting to provoke 
further investigation, to shed light on this exception that contrasts with 
the regular VOC mode of colonization. Thus the study of this particular 
colony will also enhance our understanding of the way the VOC in gen-
eral operated in Asia. 
 
But the case of Banda can be treated on a different, more abstract level as 
well. Where did the exploitational model that was implemented in Banda 
originate? It certainly is not an Asian phenomenon, even if certain 
aspects of it, such as slavery, were in fact indigenous in Asia and indeed 
in the region itself.31 However, the economic model was introduced by 
Europeans, in a way that points to European habits or intellectual origin. 
The implementation was effective enough to show that Coen and his 
subordinates knew exactly what they were up to. It has to be considered 
that the measures introduced to exploit Banda were not just as 
opportunistic addition of essentially separate economic and social 
features, but that a new settlement was created on the basis of a coherent 
system, a priori envisaged by Heeren XVII and their officers in Asia. 
Whether this is the case remains of course open to discussion, but in my 
                                                      
30We might consider the export production of sugar in Batavia during the 
17th century to be comparable. But then again, this was only a tentative, rather 
small-scale undertaking that never really yielded great profits. 
31See, for instance, B. Lasker: Human bondage in Southeast Asia (Chapel 
Hill, 1950); and, more importantly, A. Reid, ed., Slavery, bondage and depen-
dency in Southeast Asia (St. Lucia/London/New York, 1983). 
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view it can hardly be a coincidence that the basic features were intro-
duced in such a deliberate way. 
 Taking the uniqueness of Banda in Asia as a fact, it seems useful to 
try to analyze some of its structural characteristics. This will permit us to 
look at this case from another angle, to be able to compare it in a global 
context. 
 It is easy to discern certain peculiarities that are typical of a so-called 
plantation society. These includes the economic aspects of plantation 
modes of production, on which an extensive literature exists, either on 
the level of case studies or in the theoretical field. To limit ourselves to 
the last—which seems to be a more fruitful approach, for one can spend 
a lifetime of research in studying all the different plantation societies—it 
is still not easy to survey the range of publications that have seen the 
light, generating almost as many interpretations. That in itself is under-
standable, for the subject can be approached from different angles: on the 
one hand Banda can be regarded as a curiosity which is entirely his-
torical, set apart from the present day, like a world which once existed 
but is no more; or, on the other hand, when looking backwards from the 
late twentieth century, as an example of colonialism in its earliest form, 
containing still active conditions that are sufficient for the phenomenon 
which is nowadays usually called “underdevelopment.” Analysis is also 
complicated by the fact that different authors use different criteria of 
definition, focusing on land-concentration (the ratio between size and 
number of workers), or labor-force status (free v. unfree or enslaved; 
skilled v. unskilled), the share of the plantation crop in the total export, 
the crops grown, the division of labor, the ratio between capital value and 
labor (which also includes the level of technical development), and the 
distribution of political and administrative power in such a society.32 
 In order to distill a workable, though in the eyes of experts possibly 
rather superficial theoretical model of a plantation economy on a general 
                                                      
32For an overview of these problems, see the excellent review article by F. L. 
Pryor, “The plantation economy as an economic system,” Journal of Com-
parative Economics 6 (1982): 288–317. In his concluding note (p. 314), Pryor 
remarks, “the subject has evoked considerable differences of opinion about what 
a plantation is and how a plantation economy functions. The literature is con-
fusing. We have many questions but very few solid answers. We have a number 
of case studies about how specific plantation economies work, but no general 
theory about their functioning.” 
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level, in the following lines I will for the sake of brevity allow myself to 
accept certain inherent qualities as essential. For a start, it is an economy 
for the greater part33 based on large-scale crop production for export 
purposes, organized in agricultural production units, the plantations, that 
in its essence and manifestation deeply and severely determine society, 
as well as the personal lives of its inhabitants. The plantation units form 
the main building stones of this kind of society. 
 I intend to look at the plantation itself as an historical phenomenon, 
transported from one geographical area into another, as an example of 
physical, as well as intellectual colonialism.34 Basically, it can be seen as 
an “industrialized” form of agriculture, combining capital, land, labor, 
and technology in a rationalized mix, with the purpose of achieving 
large-scale, profitable agricultural production. 
 The invested capital needed to start a plantation is relatively high. In 
order to assure a return, the use of land, labor, and technology is focused 
on bulk production, allowing maximum efficiency and utilization. 
Capital is usually supplied by outside, or foreign investors whose main 
purpose is, of course, to maximize profits. Land, labor, and equipment 
are rationalized in a “modern” way, that is, they are regarded solely as 
commodities. 
 The relatively large-scale production plantation is dependent on a 
large-scale market, located in the country where the financier originates. 
Production is closely connected to the capacity of this market. It is highly 
specialized, usually limited to one crop only, thereby connecting the fate 
of the total economy to that of the metropolis market. 
 The planter must have enough land to enable him to produce suffi-
cient quantities of the cash crop. Otherwise, he either tends to expand his 
area or to sink into debt and eventual bankruptcy. The resulting occupa-
                                                      
33As a rule, at least 60 percent is taken as the minimum. 
34The following on the theory of plantations is based mainly on E. Wolf and 
S. Mintz, Haciendas and plantations, in Haciendas and plantations in Latin 
American history, ed. by R. G. Keith (New York/London, 1977), pp. 36–62, esp. 
48–62; also on Pryor, “The plantation economy”; L. A. Best, “Outlines of a 
model of pure plantation economy,” Social and Economic Studies 17 (1968): 
283–326; H. Bernstein and M. Pitt, “Plantations and modes of exploitation,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies 1 (1974): 514–526; and V. Rubin, A. Tuden, eds., 
Comparative perspectives on slavery in New World plantation societies (New 
York, 1977). 
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tion of land in such an area is also a socioeconomic determinant: it un-
dermines subsistence production, or other forms of agricultural enter-
prise, swallowing the greater part of land and agricultural labor. Being 
the major production type over a large area, the plantation sector domi-
nates the region physically as well as socially. Infrastructure, for exam-
ple, is determined by the needs of the plantations; other agricultural ini-
tiatives are literally driven to the fringes of such a society. Consequently 
there is not much room left for an agricultural middle class of independ-
ent landowners, either physically or economically. The capacity of such 
an agricultural society to produce economic alternatives to the produc-
tion of only one or two crops is very small. As a result, the whole econ-
omy remains extremely vulnerable to influences and developments of the 
outside markets to which it is linked, notably in the selling area (the 
metropolis market), but also in neighboring economic units. 
 For reasons of profitability, there must be a large reserve of cheap 
labor. If not available in the region itself, laborers often need to be im-
ported from other areas. The usually unskilled worker has no relationship 
with the enterprise other than through his labor power. His individual 
position is very weak. Because of this, workers imported from different 
regions may develop transcultural ties that break down ethnic or cultural 
differences, a process that eventually can result in total acculturation. 
 Technology can play a relevant role in a plantation. The processing 
and transportation of a bulk crop can be facilitated and the cost reduced 
by using technical knowledge and skills. Technical knowledge rests with 
the owner or his representative; the teaching of certain technical skills to 
some laborers may result in more specific labor division and stratifica-
tion. 
 All this means that production is organized by a planter—not neces-
sarily the owner of the land, for absenteeism is quite common—who, 
sometimes with a small staff, controls the estate and the production, and 
supervises the laborers and nearly all their activities. The purpose is to 
produce a crop that is meant for export, not for an internal market, or for 
subsistence use. The planter brings in the agricultural and entrepreneurial 
knowhow, and the financial and administrative means necessary to run 
the business. It is he who possesses the technology and the power to 
apply it; it is he who decides what work must be done and how it will be 
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divided. His workers are usually unskilled, or barely trained, laborers.35 
Whether they are slaves, or (poorly paid) wage-workers, they are always 
dependent on the planter. His power over the workers is extensive; there 
is hardly anything that escapes his attention or influence, and in many 
cases he literally rules their lives. As a matter of fact, almost all activities 
in a plantation consist of tilling the land, harvesting, and preparing the 
crop for export. The latter may take the form of a more or less indus-
trialized process, as in the case of sugar production. 
 Whatever the value of this (rather conservative) description, it con-
centrates on the crop production for export purpose, and the resulting 
dependency on the country, or region where it is marketed, as well as on 
the specific mix of capital investment, technology use, and labor organi-
zation. The construction of this theoretical model seems to have led us 
off to Latin America or, more interesting still—for here we are con-
cerned with small-island economies as well—to the Caribbean. However, 
this model seems to apply fully to the situation on Banda as well. The 
outlines of the new Bandanese colony I have drawn above are congruent 
to this model distilled from general theoretical literature. On Banda, too, 
there was a large-scale market production of a single crop (nutmeg, of 
which mace is a by-product) that was exported to another economic 
sphere, realized by the typical combination of capital supplied by 
overseas investors, knowhow supplied by the planters, and labor 
provided by the mass of unskilled workers. The relation with the me-
tropolis appears to have been all-important as well: it was there that the 
enterprise was financed, its contents defined, and its produce marketed. 
 As I stated before, I am not yet fully convinced that the initiating and 
operational conditions that determined the new Banda economy were all 
part of one coherent system, even though they were introduced in such a 
deliberate way. Can we, incidentally, really speak of the implementation 
of a system in the meaning of a series of measures that are linked to each 
other by their own internal logic? 
 Whatever the answer to this question might be, the hypothesis that 
Banda was indeed a plantation colony, ostensibly sustained by the indi-
cations that I described above, plays a central part in my study. Of 
course, historical analysis and reconstruction are all-important, and that 
                                                      
35“Unskilled” is here used in the meaning of not (properly) trained to do the 
job to which they are assigned. 
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laborious but fascinating task certainly has to precede the attempt to an-
swer theoretical questions of this kind. But if this question can be an-
swered in the affirmative it would indeed make Banda an even more ex-
ceptional case, for not only would it confirm once again that the situation 
in Banda was unique and incomparable from a VOC administrative point 
of view, but also that the socioeconomic system that was introduced 
here, in this remote little Asian archipelago, was rooted in the same 
European concepts, or set of ideas, that lay at the basis of Central 
American island economies. This would lift Banda above the status of a 
mere historic peculiarity—which it undoubtedly is—to an outstanding 
example within a general theory of economic and social development. In 
my opinion, that would mean nothing less than a Caribbean cuckoo in an 
Asian nest. 
